ABSTRACT

In July 1995, the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and paramilitary forces carried out a genocide in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina that claimed the lives of over 8,000 Muslims. Understanding this tragic period necessitates an examination of documents from the United Nations (UN) and the VRS. According to UN documents, it was ill-equipped and underprepared to deal with the situation. Daily reports suggest insufficient resources, restricted movement, and dependence on rumors owing to limited access to information, limiting their capacity to deliver meaningful aid. VRS records illustrate the organized character of the genocide through explicit talks and coded language used to hide operations. However, critical personal histories and contextual information on the VRS members are missing, leaving unresolved questions regarding motivations. Documents from both the UN and VRS provide distinct viewpoints. UN records highlight the problems of an underprepared organization, while VRS testimony sheds light on the organized nature of the genocide. Through an analysis of daily UN reports and select testimony from VRS members at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), this paper argues that the shortcomings of international intervention and the deliberate, organized actions of the VRS were crucial factors in enabling the genocide at Srebrenica, shedding light on both the failures of the global community and the calculated strategies employed by those responsible.